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SUMMARY
The apparent family clustering of avian inﬂuenza A/H5N1 has led several groups to postulate the
existence of a host genetic inﬂuence on susceptibility to A/H5N1, yet the role of host factors on
the risk of A/H5N1 disease has received remarkably little attention compared to the eﬀorts
focused on viral factors. We examined the epidemiological patterns of human A/H5N1 cases,
their possible explanations, and the plausibility of a host genetic eﬀect on susceptibility to
A/H5N1 infection. The preponderance of familial clustering of cases and the relative lack of
non-familial clusters, the occurrence of related cases separated by time and place, and the paucity
of cases in some highly exposed groups such as poultry cullers, are consistent with a host genetic
eﬀect. Animal models support the biological plausibility of genetic susceptibility to A/H5N1.
Although the evidence is circumstantial, host genetic factors are a parsimonious explanation
for the unusual epidemiology of human A/H5N1 cases and warrant further investigation.
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INTRODUCTION
Human cases of inﬂuenza A subtype H5N1 appear to
cluster in families, a pattern which has led several
authors to comment that host genetics may play an
important role in susceptibility to A/H5N1 infection
or disease [1–5]. This has potentially far-reaching
implications, since the identiﬁcation and subsequent
characterization of genetic factors that have a strong
inﬂuence on susceptibility to A/H5N1 disease would
highlight key virus–host interactions necessary or
contributory to infection or disease. Elucidating these
key interactions has the potential to catalyse advances
in areas such as the prediction of viral pathogenicity
and the development of new or improved preventive
and therapeutic interventions, which may be of
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relevance not only to zoonotic inﬂuenza but also to
seasonal and pandemic inﬂuenza.
Since it re-emerged in 2003 A/H5N1 has received
enormous attention, including the allocation of sub-
stantial ﬁnancial resources for vaccine development
and pandemic preparedness. Yet the reasons for
its scarcity in humans, its poor ability to transmit
between people, the clustering of cases and the
risk factors for infection remain elusive; as does our
ability to predict the likelihood that A/H5N1 may
become a pandemic virus. Most research has focused
on the viruses; through genotypic and phenotypic
analysis and animal experiments using modiﬁed
viruses, but the other half of the equation, the host,
has been relatively neglected. Since it is epidemi-
ological patterns that have stimulated consideration
of host genetic factors, an important ﬁrst step is
to review whether the epidemiological patterns are
consistent with a host genetic inﬂuence. Currently
only two publications have explicitly examined the
potential role of host genetics and human A/H5N1
infection. Pitzer et al. have looked at whether the ob-
served clustering could be explained by chance alone
[6]. Trammell & Toth have reviewed possible bio-
logical mechanisms of host susceptibility to inﬂuenza,
usingmostly data frommurinemodels [7].We examine
the epidemiological patterns of human A/H5N1 cases,
their possible explanations, and review the evidence
for a role for host genetics in susceptibility to inﬂu-
enza A/H5N1.
THE CASE IN FAVOUR OF A ROLE FOR
HOST GENETICS
Familial aggregation of cases
Between 1 January 1997 and 25 November 2009 a
total of 36 clusters of two or more laboratory-
conﬁrmed cases of A/H5N1 have been reported, with
at least an additional 16 clusters of one conﬁrmed case
plus at least one probable case [3, 4, 8–11] (Table 1).
These 52 clusters account for 22% (103/463) of all
laboratory-conﬁrmed cases and only six of the 103
cases occurring in clusters did not have a genetic re-
lationship to another case in the cluster. Although
there is no data on the familial aggregation of other
zoonosis for comparison, this degree of family clus-
tering has surprised many people, especially since
A/H5N1 is considered to only rarely transmit
from person to person. Since familial aggregation is a
hallmark of genetically determined diseases, genetic
susceptibility to A/H5N1 infection is one hypothesis
Table 1. Number of conﬁrmed H5N1 cases and clusters by country
Country
Total
laboratory-conﬁrmed
cases*
No. of
clusters#
n/N (% ) of
conﬁrmed cases
occurring in
clusters
Azerbaijan 8 2 6/8 (75)
Bangladesh 1 0 0/1 (0)
Cambodia 8 1 1/8 (12)
China, mainland 38 4 4/38 (10)
Djibouti 1 0 0/1 (0)
Egypt 88 4 9/88 (10)
China, Hong Kong 20 2 4/20 (20)
Indonesia 141 18 36/141 (25)
Iraq 3 1 2/3 (67)
Laos PDR 2 0 0/2 (0)
Myanmar 1 0 0/1 (0)
Nigeria 1 1 1/1 (100)
Pakistan 3 1 3/3 (100)
Thailand 25 3 5/25 (20)
Turkey 12 2 6/12 (50)
Vietnam 111 13 26/111 (23)
Total (all countries) 463 52 103/463 (22)
* As of 25 November 2009.
# A cluster is deﬁned as at least two cases of clinically compatible illness with at
least one case with laboratory-conﬁrmed H5N1.
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that might explain the familial aggregation. Un-
fortunately the apparent increased risk in relatives
of aﬀected cases compared to background risk has
not been quantiﬁed and the large cluster in Karo,
Indonesia was a missed opportunity to estimate the
familial relative risk by comparing the risk in related
and unrelated contacts of infected individuals. How-
ever, what we do know is that this cluster involved
eight cases (seven laboratory-conﬁrmed) in a single
extended family residing in four households [12]. Nine
family members slept in the same room as the primary
case while the case was symptomatic and three of
these nine (33%) developed A/H5N1 infection [13]. It
is perhaps surprising that there were no unrelated
cases despite multiple opportunities for infection of
non-related contacts, including unprotected health-
care workers, and onset dates that stretched over a
period of 3 weeks [14].
The relative absence of non-familial aggregation
of cases
If all members of a community aﬀected by A/H5N1
outbreaks in poultry are at equal risk then it would be
more likely to observe pairs of cases of unrelated
community members than to see household clusters
[6]. Yet of the 103 conﬁrmed cases occurring in 52
clusters, only six cases occurring in four clusters were
not genetically related to any other case in the cluster
[one husband and wife pair (Vietnam 2005); one
healthcare worker (Vietnam 2005) ; one neighbour
(Azerbaijan 2006) ; two children (Egypt 2009)] [11].
This pattern is important since it suggests either
large diﬀerences in risk between families within aﬀec-
ted communities, or large biases in the detection and
reporting of family-based clusters compared to un-
related case clusters.
Related but unassociated cases
At least two incidents have occurred where genetically
related individuals developed conﬁrmed or probable
A/H5N1 disease independently of one another.
In August 2004 a 25-year-old women from
Hau Giang Province, southern Vietnam died from
laboratory-conﬁrmed A/H5N1. Both the 19-year-old
brother of this case and their 23-year-old cousin died
of severe pneumonia within a week of the conﬁrmed
case ; specimens from these two cases were not tested
for A/H5N1. The brother lived with the conﬁrmed
case but the cousin lived in a non-adjacent commune
and investigations revealed that there had been no
contact whatsoever between the cousin (and her im-
mediate family) and the siblings (and their immediate
family) in the week prior to the earliest onset of illness
and the deaths. Local authorities concluded that
there was no likelihood of a common point source
of infection or of any other means of transmission of
A/H5N1 between the cousin and the sibling cases.
Therefore, the disease in the cousin seems to have
occurred independently from the sibling cases.
In Thailand three related individuals suﬀered
A/H5N1 infection during two diﬀerent waves of the
outbreak. The ﬁrst case was a boy (C.P.) who died
during the ﬁrst wave of outbreaks in late 2003–2004
[15]. The mother of case C.P. also died of a respiratory
illness at the same time as her son, but samples were
not available for testing for A/H5N1 [8]. The other
two cases, a father and son (B.O and R.R.), were in-
fected in the 2005 outbreak [16]. Their family pedigree
is shown in Figure 1. C.P. lived in the same province
but a diﬀerent district to B.O. and R.R.
Given the scarcity of A/H5N1 disease, these in-
cidents of related but apparently unconnected cases
seem an improbable misfortune, unless relatives have
an increased risk of A/H5N1 infection compared to
the general population.
Exposure and risk are not well correlated
Although data from three case-control studies show
that contact with dead or dying poultry is a signiﬁcant
risk factor for A/H5N1 infection, the proportion of
cases that can be attributed to this factor is not high
[17–19]. About 25% of all conﬁrmed clinical cases of
H5N1 infection cannot recall any recent poultry ex-
posure before illness onset and in many other cases
B.O.
R.R.
C.P.
Fig. 1. Family pedigree showing three H5N1 aﬀected
individuals, with infections separated by 2 years.
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the reported exposure to infected poultry is tenuous
[17, 20–22]. The largest case-control study published
so far found that only 28% of all cases could be at-
tributed to preparing or cooking sick poultry [17]. The
same study found no diﬀerences between aﬀected
and unaﬀected households in other poultry-handling
practices, hygiene behaviour or in other putative
risk factors such as the use of poultry fertilizer. This
absence of obvious risky practices in many aﬀected
individuals and families juxtaposes starkly with the
almost complete absence of clinical cases in groups
who are known to have engaged in theoretically very
high-risk behaviours, i.e. culling infectedpoultry ﬂocks
without personal protective equipment.
From 2003 to 31 January 2010, 49 countries have
reported over 6660 outbreaks of highly pathogenic
avian inﬂuenza A/H5N1 in domestic poultry or wild-
life to the World Organization for Animal Health and
several hundred million poultry have died or been
culled. These ﬁgures are a minimum, since only a
proportion of all outbreaks are detected and reported.
The number of people exposed to A/H5N1 as a result
of reported and unreported outbreaks is not known
but we do know that exposure to poultry is very
common in many of the worst aﬀected countries. One
population-based study of more than 45000 people
in an A/H5N1-aﬀected community in Vietnam found
that 25.9% (11 755) lived in households where poultry
were sick or had died [23]. A community survey in
Cambodia of 155 poultry-raising households in an
A/H5N1-aﬀected area identiﬁed poultry deaths in 102
households (66%), and 42 households (27%) were
considered likely to have experienced an outbreak
of A/H5N1 [19]. A larger survey in Cambodia esti-
mated that most of the rural population has frequent
contact with poultry and 52% regularly have a
potentially high-risk exposure [1]. Therefore it likely
that very large numbers of people, possibly millions,
have been exposed to A/H5N1 since 2003 yet only 471
human cases have been reported globally over the
same period. It can be safely assumed that these
numbers, like poultry outbreaks, are a minimum as
the clinical presentation is non-speciﬁc and few
sites possess the capabilities to diagnose A/H5N1.
Although a survey in two aﬀected villages in
Cambodia found serological evidence of subclinical
A/H5N1 infection in seven (1%) out of 674 subjects
[24], evidence from active surveillance and serological
surveys of populations known to be exposed to
A/H5N1 generally indicates that large numbers of
cases are not being missed [19, 21, 25–33]. While the
sensitivity and reproducibility of serological assays
for A/H5N1 infection is variable, many serological
studies have used the gold standard of micro-
neutralization assay with Western blot conﬁrmation
and therefore provide the best estimate currently
available of A/H5N1 infection prevalence [34, 35].
The apparent low incidence of infection following
exposure to sick poultry and the low risk in some
intensely exposed groups indicates a substantial
species barrier, but a barrier that seems to be much
weaker in a small number of individuals and families
[36].
Person-to-person transmission
Families live together in intimate contact and person-
to-person transmission has been convincingly put
forward as an explanation for two family clusters
[37, 38] and an additional ﬁve reports have stated
that it could not be ruled out in at least seven families
[3, 4, 39–41]. The evidence for person-to-person
transmission outside of the family is mixed. In
the investigation of the 1997 Hong Kong cases, sero-
positive healthcare workers were identiﬁed, but none
have been found in subsequent studies [28, 31, 42]
and, as previously mentioned, non-familial clusters
are rare. Person-to-person transmission of A/H5N1
clearly can occur but what is perhaps most interesting
is the presence of limited intra-familial person-to-
person transmission risk but its possible absence in
other settings. This could be explained by the special
intimacy of familial relationships but alternatively
it could be an indicator of a genetic inﬂuence on
risk; i.e. family members are at increased risk of
person-to-person transmission because of a shared
genetic susceptibility to infection from any source.
Biological plausibility
Certain animal species are more susceptible to H5N1
than other species and possible factors determining
the host-range restriction of avian inﬂuenza viruses
have been reviewed elsewhere [36, 43, 44]. However,
within-species diﬀerences also exist and in-bred mice
strains exhibit large diﬀerences in their susceptibility
to inﬂuenza infection [7, 45–47]. Indeed, diﬀerences in
susceptibility of mouse strains to inﬂuenza infection,
followed by mapping of the mouse disease loci and
identiﬁcation of the region on the human chromo-
some has led to the identiﬁcation of the human Mx
genes involved in response to viral infections [48–50].
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Trammell & Toth have reviewed possible biological
mechanisms of host susceptibility to inﬂuenza in the
mouse model and similar host genetic inﬂuences on
susceptibility to infection or disease might also exist
in humans [7]. In fact a recent study demonstrated
genetic susceptibility to A/H5N1 in mice and called
for studies of genetic susceptibility in humans [47].
However, to date no human genetic studies of sus-
ceptibility to inﬂuenza have been conducted, other
than two genealogical studies, one of which identiﬁed
a heritable predisposition to death from inﬂuenza
[51, 52].
Candidate host genes that may contribute to severe
inﬂuenza illness can be proposed a priori from known
virus–host interactions critical to infection, repli-
cation and pathogenesis [53]. Alternatively, gene-
expression proﬁling using microarrays may provide
insights into genes associated with severe disease
[54]. The role of cell surface sialic acid receptors in the
determination of host speciﬁcity of inﬂuenza viruses
is well documented and therefore the genes encoding
these receptors and their associated glycan modiﬁ-
cations are potential candidates [55–58]. Cytokine
dysregulation has been shown to be a feature of
A/H5N1 infection in clinical and animal studies
[59–61] and various aspects of innate immunity
including collectin-like mannose-binding lectin, toll-
like receptors (TLR 3, 7, 8), cytokines, chemokines,
and interferon-inducible proteins such as MxA are
also plausible candidates [62–68]. Interestingly, sus-
ceptibility to other viral respiratory pathogens has
been traced to genes of the innate immune system
[69–73].
THE CASE AGAINST
Chance
Pitzer et al. [6] have argued that the observed
pattern of clustering of A/H5N1 cases can be ex-
plained by chance and does not provide evidence
for a genetic eﬀect. However, the application of simi-
lar methods using real data on household structures
in Vietnam show that observing 22% of cases oc-
curring in household clusters is consistent with a
risk of infection following exposure of around 8%
(95% prediction interval 6–10%) (Fig. 2). If the true
risk of infection following exposure were 8%, the
current 500 cases would be the result of exposure of
only 6250 people globally over the past 5 years. This is
an implausibly low number. The number of people
exposed is certainly orders of magnitude higher, the
risk of infection following exposure substantially
lower than 8% and, therefore, the observation of
22% household clustering unlikely to be a probable
outcome unless other factors are in play. Even if the
risk of infection following exposure were 8%, and
22% of cases occurring in household clusters were
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Fig. 2. Proportion of cases occurring in household clusters by probability of infection for diﬀerent household sizes. (a) All
data. (b) Enlargement of left-hand corner of panel (a). The broken black lines represent the modelled data for household sizes
ranging from nine persons (top) to one person (bottom). The solid red line is the median estimate of the modelled data
applying the observed range of household sizes in a Vietnamese cohort. Red dotted lines represent 95% prediction intervals
for 10 000 simulations. The solid green lines show the probability of infection compatible with the observed clustering of
about 0.22 for median estimate and 95% prediction intervals of model.
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simply a numerical result of this high risk, in any
single aﬀected community we would expect to observe
around three sporadic cases for every case occurring
in a household cluster (75% vs. 25%). As described
above, we actually see few non-familial community
clusters. The model of Pitzer et al. also only con-
sidered exposure of entire nuclear families with
every family member at equal risk. This negates the
inﬂuence of single or couple households, and oc-
cupational exposures outside of the home and there-
fore over-emphasizes the probability of familial
clusters.
Bias
A key premise is that the observed clustering is a true
reﬂection of the real situation – not simply an appar-
ent pattern caused by biases. It is probable that mul-
tiple cases of severe pneumonia in healthy children or
adults clustered in time and space are more likely than
sporadic cases to be perceived as abnormal and
therefore reported to the authorities. It is also true
that following a ﬁrst case which was severely ill or
fatal, a second case in a family will rapidly seek
medical attention; and indeed several of the reported
clusters consist of a ﬁrst fatality which is clinically
suspicious of H5N1 and a second laboratory-
conﬁrmed case. So the observed level of clustering
could be an artifact of diﬀerential ascertainment of
clustered vs. sporadic cases. While this bias is bound
to be operating to some extent, the question is whether
it fully explains the clustering. Moreover, it might be
expected that this ascertainment bias would apply
similarly to community clusters of genetically un-
related cases as to family clusters.
Confounding
Familial risk does not necessarily mean genetic risk;
families share their homes, food and behaviours
with one another and therefore shared ‘high-risk’
exposures must be a strong contender to explain
family clusters. Indeed, the paucity of community
clusters of genetically unrelated human H5N1 cases
has been suggested to be a reﬂection of risky beha-
viours which are unique to the aﬀected families [6]. As
noted above, unusual or risky practices have been
identiﬁed but it has not been possible to attribute
many cases to these behaviours since the behaviours
are widespread in the community yet absent in many
cases. It is certainly possible that behavioural factors
partially or completely explain the epidemiological
patterns but these have yet to be identiﬁed.
The scarcity of human cases despite widespread
exposure clearly demonstrates a substantial barrier to
humans acquiring infection, and much work has fo-
cused on unravelling the genetic and functional
characteristics of the viruses which would explain
these barriers [74]. There are clear diﬀerences between
virus strains in their ability to infect and cause severe
disease in animal models but the viruses isolated from
human cases occurring in family clusters have not
been found to be substantially diﬀerent from viruses
causing sporadic human cases or poultry outbreaks
[75]. The family clusters have occurred in 11 diﬀerent
countries as a result of infections with ﬁve diﬀerent
clades (0, 1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3). So while virus factors are
certainly critical in limiting the transmission of inﬂu-
enza A/H5N1 from animals to humans, current data
do not allow us to attribute family clustering to viral
factors.
CONCLUSION
The routinely available data on the epidemiology of
human cases of A/H5N1 show some unusual patterns
to which host genetic susceptibility oﬀers a parsi-
monious explanation. Of course, this does not mean it
is true; but it is both epidemiologically and biologi-
cally plausible and worthy of serious investigation.
The importance of host genetics in infectious diseases
is increasingly being recognized and explored [76–78]
and the relationship is usually a complex interaction
between the pathogen, environmental inﬂuences and a
range of innate and adaptive host factors. This poses
diﬃculties for attempts to detect genetic inﬂuences on
susceptibility to H5N1, since very large sample sizes
are needed to detect complex or weak eﬀects, yet the
total number of cases is very small. However, a host
genetics association study may potentially be in-
formative if high-risk genotypes are present. A more
powerful strategy would be a genome-wide linkage
study in aﬀected families, which could interrogate the
whole genome without assuming any prior hypoth-
eses on plausible candidate genes. Given the import-
ance of understanding the key virus–host interactions
underlying severe human inﬂuenza, a search for such
genetic factors in A/H5N1 is worthwhile. However,
the scarcity and widespread distribution of human
case means that international collaboration is essen-
tial to conduct studies of genetic susceptibility to
A/H5N1 disease.
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